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*to
Dubs Death*

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In connection with the joint deliberations of the Subcommittees on International Operations and Asian and Pacific Affairs on April 26, concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, the following additional items are submitted by the Department of State:

(2)

-- The corrected transcript of the testimony of Ambassador Quainton and Messrs. Lorton and Lannon.

-- Additional responses requested for inclusion in the hearing record.

Sincerely,

Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:
As stated

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY *McCauley* DATE *3-13-81*
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The Honorable
Dante Fascell,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

Drafted:

M/CT:RDots:pd 6/7/79

Approved:

M/CT:ACEQuainton

Clearances: A/SY/SAS:J Lannon

NEA/PAB:R Lorton

H:R Flaten

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Ten individuals were directly participating in the Afghanistan Working Group. Three staff members of the Iran Working Group were present throughout the night. Senior officials of the Department, including the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Management and the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, were closely involved during each incident. Both Working Groups were supported by the staff of the Department of State Operations Center.

Insert (addition)

The third was identified by Embassy officers and the fourth remained unidentified.

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On the morning of March 25, 1978 an ICA local employee discovered a threat letter on the floor next to his desk in the ICA library. The letter, purportedly written by an organization calling itself "Charika-ye-Feda'i-ye-Khalq" (People's Sacrifice Guerrillas - PSG), threatened an attack against American citizens in Kabul beginning that date unless the ICA Cultural Center was closed. The letter contained a number of incantations lauding Mao Tse-Tung, Lenin and Arafat. No further threats were received and U.S. agencies were unable to establish the credibility of the threat.

Following receipt of the threat, then Ambassador Eliot met with appropriate Afghan officials and Embassy officers to evaluate the threat. The Embassy was brought to an alert status, additional security measures were undertaken and all American and local employees were briefed on the threat and advised to take appropriate precautions. The Afghan Government provided additional police sentries for the principal American installations in Kabul, for three senior officers' residences and an armed detail of Afghan police in a follow car was assigned to the Ambassador. Ambassador Eliot discontinued the use of a follow car just prior to the coup as he felt it was no longer required. He did not consult the Department about that decision, which was based on his assessment of the situation then prevailing in Kabul.

At no time was there a diminution of the level of security at Kabul. The security posture was raised to an alert status. As the threat dissipated over time, increased security measures taken in response were reduced commensurately.

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Political Counselor Bruce FLATIN, Regional Security Officer Charles BOLES and Consular Officer Michael MALINOWSKI viewed the bodies of the four terrorists on February 14, 1979 at 8:00 p.m.

They were told by an unidentified police official that the four bodies were those of the terrorists killed in the shootout at the Kabul Hotel. The Embassy officers requested that they be allowed to view the terrorists' clothing and weapons. They were informed that such a request would have to be submitted to the Prime Ministry.

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An unnamed police official presented the bodies after the invitation was conveyed through the Afghan Foreign Ministry's Protocol Department.

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Afghan official believed to have been in charge at the scene (Kabul Hotel) on February 14, 1979 was identified as a Major SAIFUDDIN, Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (described as one of TAROON's closest aides).

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Political Counselor Bruce FLATIN, Regional Security Officer Charles BOLES, Consular Officer Michael MALINOWSKI and Foreign Service National Employee Khalig GHAFARI arrived at the Kabul Hotel at approximately 0900 hours.

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We first learned of the demand for the release of Bahes as a result of the Afghan Government's official press account of the assassination carried in the February 14, 1979, issue of the Kabul Times, "The terrorists demanded that a man named Bahruddin Bahes, who is not in Afghanistan and his residence is not known, be placed at their disposal."

In its 5:00 PM news broadcast on February 14th Radio Afghanistan announced the news of Ambassador Dubs' kidnapping and death. According to this broadcast, the perpetrators were "several anti-Khalqi terrorists" who subsequently demanded the release of a political prisoner named "Bahruddin."

The Afghan official report of the kidnapping and killing of Ambassador Dubs was submitted to the Embassy on February 27, 1979, by Dr. Mohammad Rafik Shamreiz, Director of the Third Political Division (Europe and Americas), of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The report indicated that the terrorists had demanded the release of Bahruddin Bahes from jail.